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RECENT CASES

consortium. Eleven state courts16 and several federal district courts
have considered the problem since 1950, and basing their verdicts
on the reasoning of the Hitaffer case, have overruled contrary
decisions and allowed the wife a cause of action. During 7this same
period, seventeen states refused to follow the Hitaffer case.'
The principal case is the second time the question of a wife's right
to recover for the negligent interference with her right to consortium
has been before the Kentucky court since the Hitaffer decision. In
1952, in LaEase v. Cincinnati,N. & C. Ry.,18 the court, while acknowledging the Hitaffer decision, felt bound by stare decisis and denied
recovery without any discussion of the actual problem involved. In
the principal case, the court made a complete examination of the
problem involved and the progress of the law on the subject, taking
special note of the progress since 1950 and the Hitaffer case. The
court in its closing paragraph summed up its findings:
In the present age the distinction between the right of a wife and
of a husband to maintain the action is at odds with reason. The same
may be said as to the inconsistency inherent in recognizing a wife has a
cause of action for the impairment of consortium where her husband's
injury was the result of an intentional or malicious wrong, but not
where it is the result of negligence. Nevertheless, since there is a
diversity of opinion among the courts in other jurisdictions and this
court has heretofore expressly declined to depart from its earlier decision,
having regard for the doctrine of stare decisis, we affirm the judgment.19

It is felt that the court placed undue weight on the doctrine of
stare decisis 20 and it is urged that at its next opportunity the court
bestow upon the wife this right of action for the negligent interference with her consortium.
Thomas C. Greene

CONTRACrS-CONSiDERATION-EFFECr OF SUBSEQUENT COMPROMISE FOR

MomE MoNEY.-The defendant advertised for subcontractor bids on
various phases of a large construction project. The plaintiff, a subcontractor, submitted a bid to the defendant, and was subsequently
advised that its figure would be used in defendant's bid. The de16

Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. R.R., supra note 10, at 174.
Ibid.
249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952).
2100 Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. R.R., supra note 10, at 174.
"It is as much the duty of this court to restore a right which has been
erroneously withheld by judicial opinion as it is to recognize it properly in the
first instance. We do indeed have a 'charge to keep', but that is not a charge to
perpetuate error.... " Felton Judge, in Brown v. Ga.-Tenn. Coaches, Inc.,
88 Ga. App. 519, 527; 77 S.E.2a 24, 82 (1953).
17
18
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fendant was awarded the general contract. This information came
almost immediately to the plaintiff's attention, whereupon a recheck
of its figures revealed a substantial error in calculation. The plaintiff
attempted unsuccessfully to convey this information to the defendant,
which first learned of the mistake, as well as plaintiff's alleged withdrawal, some thirty days later. The plaintiff, insisting it was not
bound, demanded more money before it would perform. The defendant objected strenuously, and for two months "hard bargaining"
ensued. Subsequently both parties entered into a written contract,
the plaintiff agreeing to do the work called for in its first bid and the
defendant agreeing to pay more money. The defendant insisted that
it never intended to pay the plaintiff the additional amount, but only
as much as necessary to get it to complete the job. This turned out
to be more than the original figure. The plaintiff then sued for the
remaining difference and defendant counterclaimed for the overage.
The trial court held that the plaintiff's bid had ripened into a
contract, and that the defendant in entering the subsequent contract
was acting solely for its own benefit. There was an abrogation of the
original contract and sufficient consideration to support the subsequent
one. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Held: Affirmed. Even
though there may have been a pre-existing duty on the part of the
plaintiff, the fact that the subsequent contract is a good faith compromise of each party's position makes it binding. "[W]hat happened,
in substance, was a mutual surrender, by the parties, of their antithetical positions, in exchange for a new, formally executed, complete
and binding contract."i Richards Construction Company v. Air Conditioning Company, 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963).
The trial court, in finding that the original bid had ripened into a
valid contract, followed the holding of a recent California case, Drennan v. Star Paving Company.2 In that case, the subcontractor upon
discovering a mistake, sought to withdraw its bid prior to formal
acceptance, but after the general contractor had relied thereon. The
court, basing its decision on promissory estoppel,3 held the subcontractor's bid binding, and thus allowed the general contractor to
4
recover damages resulting from the defendant's refusal to perform.
'318 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1963).
251
Cal. App. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
3

Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932) provides that "a promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite

and substantial character on the part of the promises and which does induce such

action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the4 promise."
An exception exists in these situations where the general contractor knew
or as a reasonable man should have known of the subcontractor's mistake. For
(Continued on next page)
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Although most courts have in the past refused to apply the promissory
estoppel doctrine in other than gratuitous promise-type situations, 5
it is now more generally approved.( This has been particularly true
since the decision in the Drennan case, which has been commented
upon favorable as a beneficial advancement of the role of promissory
7
estoppel in commercial contracts.
Upon accepting the finding of the trial court that a valid contract
had been formed, the pre-existing duty doctrine presents itself. Was
there sufficient consideration to support the subsequent contract, in
view of the generally accepted rule that a "subsequent contract to
8
perform a pre-existing duty for more money is nudum pactumf'?
The general contractor argued as follows: the plaintiffs bid did in
fact ripen into a binding contract. This imposed a duty upon the
subcontractor to perform certain work. In the subsequent contract,
the plaintiff promised to do no more than this very same work. Therefore, under the pre-existing duty rule, as exemplified in the classic
case of Alaska Packers Association v. Domenico," there was no consideration for the subsequent contract and it was thus void.
Considering the wide acceptance of the pre-existing duty rule, the
court could justifiably have stopped here by accepting the defendant's
position, but it declined, insisting that to do so would be unduly
harsh and technical. Having found evidence of a good faith dispute,
the court seized upon this to satisfy the necessary consideration to
support the subsequent contract. The court said:
A settlement of that dispute involves the giving up of new considerations by both parties. By proposing and signing the new contract,
[defendant's agent] . . . manifested to [plaintiff] . . . a giving up of
[defendant's] ... position that there was already a binding contract....
At the same time, [plaintiff] .

.

. gave up its position that it was not

under any duty ... by reason of the mistake .. . and became bound
by a contract that was not subject to these defects. This was sufficient
consideration ....

0

It seems difficult, however, to visualize the giving up of anything
sufficient to constitute legal consideration on the part of the plaintiff
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

discussion of unilateral mistake as grounds for recission see Simpson, Contracts 82
(1954).
5 Simpson, Contracts 135 (1954).
6 1A Corbin, Contracts §§ 194-95 (1963).
7See 59 Colum. L. Rev. 355 (1959); 47 Calif. L. Rev. 405 (1959); 10
Hastings L.J. 435 (1959); 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 413 (1959).
8 1 Williston, Contracts § 130 (3d ed. 1957).
0
Alaska Packers' Assn v. Domenico, 117 Fed. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). The
agreement to pay additional compensation for services which libelants were
legally bound to render under the old contract, was void for want of consideration.
1o Richards Construction Co. v. Air Conditioning Co., supra note 1.
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manifested in the new agreement. Application of this argument to
one in the defendant's position seems, on the other hand, quite
reasonable. It gave up a position on which it could have brought
suit and in fact obtained damages. But the "consideration" furnished
by the plaintiff, that is, giving up its position that it was under no
duty to perform (which in fact as found by the lower court it was
bound by its original bid), appears to constitute an exception to the
pre-existing duty doctrine."
It has often been said by the more liberal writers that any agreement entered into in good faith should be enforced.12 It could also
be said that equity generally favors good faith compromises. 13 Even so,
should we here accept this solution in the light of the possible results?
The court obviously put a great deal of weight on the evidence of
' hard bargaining" to establish a good faith dispute from which to
extract the necessary consideration for the subsequent contract. This
means that if the general contractor had acquiesced in the plaintiffs
first bid for more money rather than having relied on his natural
inclinations to reduce his loss exposure to a minimum, he could have
limited his liability to plaintiff's original bid under the doctrine of the
Drennan and Alaska Packers'cases. This hardly seems satisfactory.
The net effect of the principal case is a softening of the preexisting duty doctrine and a shifting of the burden of loss back to the
general contractor. This directly opposes the sound logic expressed
by the court in the Drennan case that "as between the subcontractor
who made the bid and the general contractor who reasonably relied
on it, the loss resulting from the mistake should fall on the party who
caused it."14
Sidney Clay Kinkead, Jr.

CoNsTrrrUIoNAL LAw-SuNDAY CLosING LAw-Vom FOR VAGUENESS.-

The defendant was convicted of violating a Sunday closing statute for
operating a department store. The statute' excepted from the effect
of the Sunday closing law nine specific activities and "work of necessity." On appeal the defendant contended the exception clause, par"1See also 1 Corbin, Contracts § 140 (1963).
12 1A Corbin, Contracts § 187 (1963).

Ibid.
Drennan v. Star Paving Co., supra note 2, at 413, 33 P.2d at 761. Kentucky has no case precisely in point with the principal case although fairly recent
cases indicate that its courts might be induced to follow this courts solution. See
Hall v. Fuller, 352 S.W.2d 559 (Ky. 1961); Ruckel v. Baston, 252 S.W.2d 432
(Ky. 1952).
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. 436.160 (1964).
'3
'4

